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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to overturn the lower court's
decision and have judgment entered in his favor.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
After a trial on the merits the court granted judgment
stating that plaintiff was entitled to contribution from the
Estate of William J. Ercanbrack, deceased, for all monies paid
by plaintiff on a contract and denied relief to appellant on its
counterclaim asking for judgment on a promissory note signed by
plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's decision
vacated, a decision entered in his favor,

and for a money judgment

on the counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
(a)

Plaintiff's Complaint- Statement of Facts.

On or

about September 2, 1965, plaintiff entered into an Installment
Sale and Security Agreement for the purchase of a mobile home.
(See Exhibit P-1).
by the plaintiff.

The agreement was in the name of and signed
Also on the document was the signature of the

deceased, William J. Ercanbrack.

The deceased had signed in the

lower left hand corner of the first page under a heading that
stated "Buyer Acknowledges Receipt Of An Exact Copy Of This
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

Agreement."

Plaintiff's witness testified that the deceased

signed "to secure the note,
p. 5).

to secure the agreement. "

(T. T. at

Plaintiff's witness went on to state "as I recall, he

(William J. Ercanbrack), stated that she (the plaintiff) had no
credit, and that he

(William J. Ercanbrack) would sign . . . "

Title to the mobile home was taken in the name of Naon Winkel,
the plaintiff.

(T.T. at p. 5).

September 2, 1975,

When the deceased signed the

Installment Sale and Security Agreement,

acknowledging along with plaintiff receipt of a copy of the same,
it was understood and agreed that the mobile home was to be the
plaintiff's property, no consideration flowed to him, and the
deceased claimed no title or interest in the mobile home.
Plaintiff claims full ownership to the same.

Plaintiff acknowledges

that Mr. Ercanbrack received "nothing under the terms of that
contract to sell the trailer, that is, he obtained no right or
interest" in the mobile home (See T.T. at p. 24 lines 7 to 11)
The home was purchased solely for the benefit of Miss Winkel,
the plaintiff.

(Plaintiff's witness - T.T. at p. 59).

Plaintiff took possession of the mobile home and the
mobile home dealer, Mobile Mansions, assigned the Installment
Sale and Security Agreement to Walker Bank & Trust Company with
"full recourse" on or about September 6, 1975.
Walker Bank & Trust Company brought action against

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement
because of plaintiff's failure to make the payments due
thereunder and plaintiff is in this action attempting to obtain
contribution.
(b)

Defendant's Counterclaim- Statement of Facts.

On or about November 20, 1975, plaintiff, Naon Winkel,

signed

a promissory note in the amount of $6,273.00 made payable to
the order of William J. Ercanbrack, which note fell due
September 20, 1976.

(See Exhibit D-18).

Two days thereafter

on November 22, 1975, the deceased, William J. Ercanbrack, wrote
a letter to his attorney, J. Harold Call, dated November 22, 1975,
requesting in the event of his death, that the note be treated
as "uncollectible and to be wrote off of my 1976 income as a loss."
(See Exhibit D-20).

William J. Ercanbrack died on the 26th day

of October, 1976, without the note having been paid.
I

WILLIAM J. ERCANBRACK, DECEASED, WAS MERELY AN
ACCOMMODATION MAKER AND THUS THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO
CONTRIBUTION.
Although William J. Ercanbrack might be held responsible
to the holder of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement in
event the b'.lyer and owner of the mobile home,

Naon Winkel,

failed

to pay, because of his signature appearing on the contract
indicating that he had "acknowledged receipt of an exact copy of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the agreement," the facts clearly show that if he signed as a
promissor, it was for the accommodation and as a surety for the
plaintiff (T.T. at p. 5 p. 24 and p. 59).

Under the facts of

the case he would only be secondarily liable, the plaintiff
being primarily liable.
It must be borne in mind that Mr. Ercanbrack received
no consideration for the contract (T.T. at p. 24 lines 7-ll).
The motive which prompts one to enter into a contract and the
consideration for the contract are distinct and different.
Williston, Contracts 3rd Edition Section 111.

Parties are led

into agreements by many inducements, such as the hope of profit,
the expectation of acquiring what they could not otherwise
obtain, the desire of avoiding a loss, etc.

These inducements

are not, however, either legal or equitable consideration, and
actually compose no part of the contract.
Production Company, 220

sw

163.

Hunter vs Golf Proof

See Restatement, Contracts

Section 84.
Prior to and under the NIL an accommodation party is
one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor,
or endorser, without receiving value therefore, and for the
purpose of lending his name to some person.

'~ithout

receiving

value," means without receiving value for the instrument, and
not without receiving any consideration for lending one's name.
See Carr vs Wainwright, 43 Federal 2d 507, 508; Morris County
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Brick Company vs Austin, 75 A 550.
Under the Commercial Code the essential characteristic
of an accommodation party is that the accommodation party is a
surety and even the absence of consideration is not a requisite.
Thus, under the Commercial Code defendant would not even need
to show that William J. Ercanbrack signed gratuitously.

He may

have been a paid surety or received other compensation from
Miss Winkel, the party accommodated.

The Commercial Code provides

that an accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in
any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party.
See Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A.
An "accommodated party" is the one for whose conven.i ence
the paper is made, the one for whose benefit the accommodation
party signs, or the one to whom the name or credit of another
person - the accommodating party - is loaned.
Under law the accommodation party is liable on the
instrument, this liability attaches in regard to parties other
than the accommodated party, but not in regard to the accommodated
party for whom the accommodation party is a surety.
It is well recognized that an accommodation party has
a right to subrogation.

When an accommodation party has paid an

instrument some courts maintain he may sue thereon on the

has~s

that he is subrogated to the rights of the creditor and others
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hold that he has the right to sue on the implied promise of
indemnity.

Under either theory a principal would be barred

from asking for contribution from the accommodating party.
Thus, the only issue is whether or not William J.
Ercanbrack was an accommodation maker.

The evidence is clear

that he was, he received nothing "for the instrument," and he
is not liable to the plaintiff, the party he accommodated.
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code prevents the plaintiff
from recovering against the estate of the deceased.
Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A.
"Contract of accommodation party. (1) A~ accommodation party is one who
signs the instrument in any capacity
for the purpose of lending his name
to another party to it • • .
(5) An accommodation party is not
liable to the party accommodated, and
if he pays the instrument has a right
of recourse on the instrument against
such party. "
II

THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS
INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DEAD MAN STATUTE.
Section 78-24-2 clearly states that Miss Winkel, the
plaintiff, cannot testify as to any conversation or transaction
which she had with William J. Ercanbrack, the deceased.
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This section of the code commonly referred to as
the dead man statute reads as follows:
'~ho

may not be witnesses. - the following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(3)
A party to any civil action . . . and
any person directly interested in the
event thereof • . . when the adverse party
in such action . . . defends, . . . as the
executor . • . of any deceased person . . .
as to any statement, or transaction with,
such deceased . . • or a matter of fact
whatever, which must have been equally
within the knowledge of both the witness
and such • • . deceased person . . . • "

The trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to
testify concerning transactions with the deceased which were
calculated to take him out of the status of an

~ccommodation

maker.
The transcript shows that the plaintiff tried to defraud
the estate by alleging that the June l, 1976, promissory note
signed by the deceased was due and payable and that no payments
had been made against the same.
This attempt was evidenced by her "under oath" creditor'
claim for $1600.00.

See defendant's Exhibit D-19.

It wasn't

until her deposition was taken and she was confronted with certair
cancelled checks that she admitted that nearly half of the claim
had previously been paid.

(T.T. at p. 90 and p. 91)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Defendant claims there is good cause and a need for
strictly enforcing the dead man statute in this particular case
because of Miss Winkel's previous attempts to obtain at the
expense of the minors and other children money that she was not
entitled to.
III

THE PURPORTED CODICIL DID NOT CONTAIN LANGUAGE
THAT CONCELLED THE INDEBTEDNESS PLAINTIFF OWED THE DECEASED.
The letter of November 22, 1975, provides that the
November 20, 1975, promissory note signed by Naon Winkel in
the amount of $6,273.00 was to be treated "as an uncollectible
item and to be wrote off of my 1976 income as a loss."
The deceased did not cancel the indebtedness.

His

language does not indicate he intended to make her a gift, but
he merely wanted the obligation treated as a bad debt.

A bad

debt or uncollectible obligation can be written off as a loss on
an income tax return.

However, a gift or gratuitous cancellation

of a debt could not be treated as tax deductible item on an
income tax return.

If we treat the language as making a gift,

we would defeat the clear intent spelled out in the letter or
codicil - he would not be able to treat it as a loss on his
income tax return.
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Under the circumstances, because of the financial
condition of the plaintiff, Naon Winkel,

the deceased was aware

of the fact that the expense and effort of legal action to
collect the obligation would be unfeasible - thus his instructions
to treat it as an uncollectible item and write if off as a bad
debt.

However, these practical instructions to J. Harold Call,

deceased's attorney, do not require him to ignore the obligation
or prevent him from using the same as an offset against any claim
that the plaintiff might file against the estate.
It appears to appellant that the court erred in denying
defendant's counterclaim,

in refusing to allow the executor to

use the indebtedness owed by the plaintiff to the deceased as an
offset against the claims Miss Winkle filed against the estate,and
in rendering a decision that prevents J. Harold Call from treating
the item as a bad debt for income tax purposes.

The decision

defeats and puts at naught the language used by the deceased who
said to treat the note "as an uncollectible i tern and to be wrote
off of my 1976 income as a loss," for if the court legally declares
i t a gift it would not qualify as a "deductible bad debt."
CONCLUSIONS
Pursuant to Section ?OA-3-415 the defendant "is not
liable to the party accommodated, " Naon Winkel, on any payments
she has or shall hereafter make on the Installment Sale and
Security Agreement; plaintiff is not entitled to contribution
because the deceased, William J. Ercanbrack, was an accommodation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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party under Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A.

The defendant should be

entitled to judgment against the plaintiff in the amount of
$6,273.00 on the November 20, 1975, promissory note or at least
have the right to claim the indebtedness as an offset against
the amount that the court found owed plaintiff on the June l,
1976, promissory note.
Respectfully submitted,

t

llant

30 orth Main
Heber City, Utah 84032
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